For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to the mechanism design problem for each individual buyer. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) the buyer's types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) the objective function must be linearly separable over the set of buyers, and (iii) the supply constraints must be the only constraints involving more than one buyer. Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no explicit assumption about any of the following: (i) the buyer's valuations (e.g., submodular, additive, etc), (ii) The distribution of types for each buyer, and (iii) the other constraints involving individual buyers (e.g., budget constraints, etc).
INTRODUCTION
The main challenge of stochastic optimization arises from the fact that all instances in the support of the distribution are relevant for the objective and this support is exponentially big in the size of problem. This paper addresses this challenge by giving a general decomposition technique for assignment problems on independently distributed inputs where the objective is linearly separable over the inputs. The main challenge faced by such a decomposition approach is that the feasibility constraint of an assignment problem introduces correlation in the Part of this work was done when the author was visiting Microsoft Research, New England. This work was partially supported by the NSF grant CCF-0728839 outcome of the optimal solution. In mechanism design problems, such constraints are usually the supply constraints. For example a revenue maximizing seller with unlimited supply who is facing independent buyers can decompose the problem over the buyers and optimize for each buyer independently. However, in the presence of supply constraints, a direct decomposition is not possible. Our decomposition technique can be roughly described as the following. (i) Construct a mechanism that satisfies the supply constraints only in expectation (ex-ante). The optimization problem for constructing such a mechanism can be fully decomposed over the set of buyers. (ii) Convert the mechanism from the previous step to another mechanism that satisfies the supply constraint at every instance.
We restrict our discussion to Bayesian combinatorial auctions. We are looking for mechanisms for allocating a set of heterogenous items with limited supply to a set of buyers in order to maximize the expected value of a certain objective function that is linearly separable over the buyers (e.g., welfare, revenue, etc). The buyers' types are distributed independently according to a publicly know prior. We defer the formal statement of our assumptions to section 2.
There are two challenges in designing mechanisms for multiple buyers:
(I) The decisions made by the mechanism for different buyers should be coordinated because of supply constraints. (II) The decisions made by the mechanism for each buyer has to be optimal (or approximately optimal).
The first difficulty is due to the fact that the desired mechanism has to be optimized over the joint type space of all buyers, the size of which grows exponentially in the number of buyers. The second difficulty is usually due to the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, specially in multi-dimensional settings where these constraints cannot be encoded compactly. In this paper, we mostly address the first difficulty by providing a frame-work for approximately decomposing and reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyer to the mechanism design problem for individual buyers. Our framework can be summarized as follows. We start by relaxing the supply constraints (i.e., the constraints specifying that the total number of allocated copies of each item cannot exceed the supply of that item) to hold only in expectation. In other words, we consider the set of mechanisms with the property that for each item only the ex-ante expected number of allocated copies does not exceed the supply. We show that the optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem can be constructed by independently running n single buyer mechanisms, where each single buyer mechanism is optimal for the corresponding buyer among all single buyer mechanisms that are restricted not to allocate each item with an ex-ante expected probability exceeding a certain threshold specific to each item. In particular, if we can construct and α-approximate single buyer mechanism for each buyer, then we can combine them to get an α-approximate mechanism for all buyers. We then present two methods for converting this mechanism to a mechanism that meets the supply constraints at every instance, while losing only a small constant factor in the approximation. In the first method, we serve buyers sequentially by running, for each buyer, the corresponding single buyer mechanism from the previous step. However, we sometimes randomly preclude some of the items from being offered to some buyers in order to ensure that buyers that are served later also get a chance of being offered with those items. We do this in such a way that would ensure that the ex-ante expected probability of preclusion is equalized over all buyers, and therefore simultaneously minimized for all buyers. In the second method, we run all of the single buyer mechanisms simultaneously and then modify the outcomes by deallocating some copies of the overallocated items at random while adjusting the payments respectively. We do this in such a way that would ensure the ex-ante expected probability of deallocation for each item is equalized among all copies of that item and therefore simultaneously minimized for all buyers.
We also introduce a toy problem, the magician's problem, along with a near optimal solution for it. The solution of this problem is used as the main ingredient for converting mechanisms for the relaxed problem to mechanisms for the original problem. It also yields improved generalized prophet inequalities through a direct reduction.
As applications of our general framework, we construct improved mechanisms for several settings from the literature 2 . For each setting we only construct a single buyer mechanism that satisfies the requirements of our framework, and then our generic construction can be applied to construct a mechanism for multiple buyers, using the single buyer mechanism as the building block.
Some of the proofs and other results are omitted from the current version of the paper due to space constraints, but are available in the full version.
Related Work
In single dimensional settings, most of the related works form the CS literature are either focused on approximating the VCG mechanism for welfare maximization, or approximating the Myerson's mechanism [16] for revenue maximization (e.g., [5] , [2] , [4] , [14] , [9] , [6] , [17] ). Most of them consider mechanisms that have simple implementation and are computationally efficient. For welfare maximization in single dimensional settings, [13] gives a blackbox reduction from mechanism design to algorithmic design.
In multidimensional setting, for welfare maximization, [12] presents a blackbox reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design which subsumes the earlier work of [13] . For revenue maximization, [7] presents several sequential posted pricing mechanisms for various settings with different types of matroid feasibility constraints. These mechanisms have simple implementation and approximate the revenue of the optimal mechanism. For a special form of combinatorial auctions with hard budget constraints, [3] presents an all pay BIC mechanism and a sequential posted pricing mechanism. [8] also considers various settings with hard budget constraints.
Prophet inequalities have been extensively studied in the past (e.g. [15] ). The best known bound for the generalization to sum of k choices was 1 − O( √ ln k √ k ) by [11] which we improve to 1 − 1 √ k+3 . Note that the current bound is not only asymptotically better than the previous bound, but is also tight for k = 1, where as the previous bound would be useful only for large k.
MODEL & OVERVIEW OF APPROACH
Model: We consider mechanisms for selling m indivisible heterogenous items to n buyers where there are k j copies of each item j ∈ [m]. All the relevant private information of each buyer i ∈ [n] is represented by her type t i ∈ T i where T i is the type space of buyer i. The profile of types t = (t 1 , · · · , t n ) is distributed according to a publicly known prior D. We are restricted to mechanisms from a given space of mechanisms M. For a mechanism M, we use X M ij (t) and P M i (t) to denote the random variables 3 respectively for allocation of item j to buyer i and payment of buyer i, when the profile of types is t. We are looking for mechanisms that maximize the expected value of a given objective function W (t, x, p) where t, x, and p respectively represent the types, the allocations, and the payments of all buyers. Formally, we are looking for a mechanism M ∈ M that (approximately) maximizes
Assumptions: We make the following assumptions: (A1) The buyers' types must be distributed independently, i.e., D = D 1 × · · · × D n must be a product distribution. (A2) The objective function must be linearly separable over the buyers, i.e., , then it must be that M ∈ M. We shall clarify the last assumption by giving an example. Suppose M is the space of all truthful buyer specific item pricing mechanisms, then M satisfies the last assumption. On the other hand, if M is the space of mechanisms that offer the same set of prices to every buyer, then it does not satisfy the decomposability assumption.
Formally, the problem we are looking at is to find a mechanism M that is a solution to the following program:
(P ) subject to:
Summary of Approach:
We now present an overview of our general framework for constructing approximately optimal mechanisms for the above program. We start by relaxing the supply constraints to hold only in expectation. We show that the optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem can be constructed by combining n independent single buyer mechanisms. We then present two approaches for converting the mechanism constructed in the previous step to a mechanism for the original problem. Each step is explained in more details next.
The problem is initially relaxed by requiring the supply constraints to hold only in expectation. In other words, the constraints (S) are replaced with the following constraints:
We show that an optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem can be constructed by combining n independent single buyer mechanisms. We shall first present the following definition.
Definition 1 (Primary Mechanism/Primary Benchmark).
A primary mechanism for buyer i is a single buyer mechanism M i that allows specifying an upper bound on the expected probability of allocating each item. For
is a single buyer mechanism in M i for which the ex-ante expected probability of allocating a copy of item j to buyer i is at mostq ij . The optimal primary mechanism is the one that has the highest expected objective value. A primary benchmark for buyer i is a function R i : [0, 1] m → R + that returns an upper bound on the expected objective value of the optimal primary mechanism for buyer i. If R i is the optimal primary benchmark for buyer i then R i (q i ) is exactly equal to the expected objective value of the optimal primary mechanism subject toq i .
We show that an optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem can be constructed from n independent optimal primary mechanisms. Let M * be any optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem and let q *
be the expected probability that M * allocates a copy of item j to buyer i. Let M i denote the optimal primary for each buyer i. In section 4, we prove that the mechanism that runs M i (q * i ) independently for buyer i has the same expected objective value as M * . Therefore, if we can construct the optimal primary mechanism for each buyer, then we can construct an optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem by simply using M i (q * i ) independently for each buyer i, assuming that we know how to compute the q * ij . We will show that q * ij is the optimal assignment for the following program in which R i is the optimal primary benchmark for buyer i:
In particular, in section 4, we prove that the optimal primary benchmarks R i (·) are always concave, and therefore the above program is a convex program.
Consequently, this program can be efficiently solved to compute q * ij . Note that usually each function R i is itself the optimal objective value of a linear or convex program, and does not have a closed form; in that case, all the corresponding linear/convex programs can be merged into one. So far, we have explained how the problem of constructing an optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem can be reduced to the problem of constructing the optimal primary mechanisms/primary benchmarks. Next, we explain how to convert it to a mechanism for the original problem.
We now present two approaches for converting a mechanism for the relaxed problem to a mechanism for the original problem, while losing only a small constant fraction of the expected objective value. Let M be the mechanism constructed in the previous step, which uses M i (q i ) independently for each buyer i. Since M satisfies the supply constraints only in expectation, it most likely violates those constraints in some instances. We propose two separate approaches for dealing with this issue, each one yielding a generic mechanism for the original (non-relaxed) problem. The following is a high level description of these two generic mechanisms: 1) Pre-Rounding: This mechanism serves buyers sequentially in an arbitrary order. For each buyer i, it runs M i (q i ) in whichq i is the same asq i except that some of its entries are set to 0 as explained next. The outcome of M i (q i ) is taken as the final outcome for buyer i. Settingq ij to 0 effectively precludes M i (q i ) from allocating a copy of item j to buyer i. The supply constraints are enforced by settingq ij to 0 for any item j that is sold out prior to serving buyer i. Moreover, for each item, the mechanism tries to minimize simultaneously for all buyers the expected probability of preclusion by equalizing this expected probability for all buyers. Effectively, the mechanism sometimes precludes some items from being offered to earlier buyers in order to make sure that later buyers get the same chance of being offered with those items. Note that, for any given pair of buyer and item, we only care about the expected probability of preclusion where the expectation is taken over the types of other buyers. In particular, an item might be precluded from the current buyer with probability 1 if certain scenarios of outcomes have been realized for buyers served prior to the current buyer. We show that if there are at least k copies of each item then the expected probability of preclusion of each item for each buyer is no more than 1 √ k+3 . 2) Post-Rounding: This mechanism runs M i (q i ) for each buyer i independently and then modifies the outcomes by deallocating some of the items at random to ensure that the supply constraints are met at every instance. This is done in such a way that would minimize the expected probability of deallocation observed by each buyer by equalizing this probability over all copies of each item. The payments are also scaled down accordingly by the same probability. Note that, for any given pair of buyer and item, we only care about the expected probability of deallocation, where the expectation is taken over the types of other buyers. In particular, a buyer who faces a small expected probability of deallocation could still face a deallocation probability of 1 for some items when certain profiles of types are reported by other buyers. We show that if there are at least k copies of each item, then the expected probability of deallocation is no more than 1 √ k+3 for each copy. In section 4 we explain the above mechanisms in more details and present some technical assumptions that are sufficient to ensure that they retain at least a 1 − 1 √ k+3 fraction of the expected objective value of M.
Throughout the above discussion, we have assumed that we can construct the optimal primary mechanisms and the optimal primary benchmarks. However, it is likely that we can only construct an approximation of them. Suppose for each buyer i, we only have an αapproximate primary mechanism and a corresponding concave primary benchmark R i (i.e., the expected objective value of M i (q i ) is at least R i (q i ) for everȳ q i ∈ [0, 1] m ). Then we can still used M i and R i in the above construction, but the final approximation factor will be multiplied by α. Main Result: The main result of this paper can be summarized in the following informal theorem.
Theorem 1 (Market Expansion). Suppose for each buyer i ∈ [n], we have an α-approximate primary mechanism M i and a corresponding concave primary benchmark R i . Then, with some further assumptions (explained later), we can efficiently construct a mechanism M ∈ M, using the primary mechanisms as building blocks, such that the expected objective value of M is at least γ k · α-fraction of the expected objective value of the optimal mechanism, where k = min j k j and γ k is a constant which is at least 1 − 1 √ k+3 . In order to explain our construction in more details, we shall first describe the magician's problem and its solution, which is used in equalizing the expected probabilities of preclusion/deallocation over all buyers.
THE MAGICIAN'S PROBLEM
In this section, we present an abstract online stochastic toy problem and a near-optimal solution for it. The solution to this problem is the main ingredient for combining single buyer mechanisms to construct mechanisms for multiple buyers. The solution to this problem is used to prove a generalized prophet inequality. Furthermore, it has applications in online stochastic optimization 6 Definition 2 (The Magician's Problem). A magician is presented with a series of boxes one by one. There is a prize hidden in one of the boxes. He has k magic wands that can be used to open the boxes. On each box is written a probability. If a wand is used on a box, it opens, but with at most the written probability the wand breaks. Let q i denote this probability for the i th box. The magician wishes to maximize the probability of obtaining the prize, but unfortunately the sequence of boxes, the written probabilities, and the box in which the prize is hidden are arranged by a villain, and the magician has no prior information about them (not even the number of boxes). However, it is given that i q i ≤ k, and that the villain cannot make any changes once the process has started.
The magician could fail to open a box either because he might choose to skip the box or because he might run out of magic wands before coming to the box. Note that once the magician fixes his strategy, the best strategy 6 Refer to the full version for more details.
for the villain is to put the prize in the box that has the lowest ex-ante expected probability of being opened, based on the magician's strategy. Therefore, in order for the magician to obtain the prize with a probability of at least γ, he has to devise a strategy that guarantees an exante expected probability of at least γ for opening each box. Note that the nature of the prize or even whether there is actually a prize does not affect the problem. It is easy to show the following strategy ensures an ex-ante expected probability of at least 1 4 for opening each box: For each box randomize and use a wand with probability 1 2 . But can we do better? Next we present an algorithm that takes a parameter γ and tries to ensure a minimum ex-ante expected probability of γ for opening each box. In Theorem 2, we show that for any γ ≤ 1 − 1 √ k+3 this algorithm indeed guarantees that the ex-ante expected probability of opening each box is at least γ.
Algorithm 1 (γ-Conservative Magician). The magician constructs a strategy table y j i using the dynamic programs given below. y j i specifies the probability with which the magician should choose to open the i th box if j wands have been broken prior to seeing the i th box. So if y j i = 0 or y j i = 1, then the magician makes a deterministic decision, otherwise he should randomize and open the i th box with probability y j i . We use Y i as the indicator random variable which is 1 iff the magician chooses to open the i th box. The strategy table can be computed using the following dynamic programs (note that γ is a parameter that is given):
(DP.y)
Note that computing y j i only requires the knowledge of q 1 , · · · , q i−1 , so computing y j i and making a decision about the i th box can be done even before seeing the i th box itself.
Interpretation of γ-Conservative Magician(Alg. 1):
The main idea of the algorithm is the following: After seeing the first i − 1 boxes and prior to the arrival of the i th box, the magician computes a threshold θ i as follows. θ i is the smallest integer such that the ex-ante expected probability of having lost at most θ i wands, on the first i − 1 boxes, is at least γ. In other words, if S i is the random variable that represents the number of magic wands broken prior to seeing the i th box, then θ i is chosen to be the smallest integer such that P r[S i ≤ θ i ] ≥ γ. Observe that if the magician always opens the i th box when the number of wands broken so far is no more than θ i , and otherwise discards the box, then he can guarantee an ex-ante probability of at least γ for opening the i th box. Furthermore, if P r[S i ≤ θ i ] > γ, i.e. if the inequality is strict, then in the event of having broken exactly θ i wands prior to the i th box, the magician randomizes and opens the i th box with a probability strictly less than 1, which is just enough to ensure that the total ex-ante expected probability of opening the i th box is at least γ. It can be verified that φ j i , as defined by the dynamic program, is a lower bound on P r[S i ≤ j]. In fact, if q 1 , · · · , q i−1 are the exact probabilities of breaking a wand for each of the first i − 1 boxes, then P r[S i ≤ j] = φ j i . In order to prove that the above strategy ensures that each box is opened with an ex-ante expected probability of at least γ, we need to show that y j i = 0 for all j ≥ k and all i. i.e., we need to show that the strategy table of the magician does not instruct him to open a box if he has broken all of his k wands. In Theorem 2 we present a sufficient condition on γ that ensures y j i = 0 for all j ≥ k and all i.
k+3 , a γ-conservative magician guarantees that each box is opened with an ex-ante expected probability at least γ. Furthermore, if q i are the exact probabilities of breaking a wand, then the γ-conservative magician opens each box with an ex-ante expected probability exactly γ 7 Definition 3 (γ k ). We define γ k to be the largest probability such that for any instance of the magician's problem with k wands, where k ≥ k, a γ k -conservative magician with k wands can guarantee that each box is opened with an ex-ante expected probability at least γ k . By Theorem 2, we know that γ k must be at least
Observe that γ k is a non-decreasing function in k which is at least 1 2 (when k = 1) and approaches 1 as k gets larger. The next theorem shows that the lower bound of 1 − 1 √ k+3 on γ k is almost tight. Theorem 3 (Optimal Magician). For any > 0, it is not possible to guarantee an ex-ante expected probability of at least 1 − k k e k k! + for opening each box(i.e., no magician can guarantee it). Note that
Next, we prove a generalization of prophet inequalities by a direct reduction to the magician's problem.
Definition 4 (Sum of k-Choices).
A sequence of n nonnegative random variables V 1 , · · · , V n are presented to a gambler one by one in an arbitrary order. The gambler knows n and the distribution of each random variable in advance but not the order in which they are presented. Upon being presented with the random variable V i , the gambler observes the actual draw of V i and he has to decide whether to keep it or to discard. This decision cannot be changed later. The gambler must select k of the random draws from the sequence. His objective is to maximize the sum of the selected draws. The prophet knows all the actual draws in advance, so he chooses the k highest draws. We assume that the order in which the random variables are presented to the gambler is fixed in advance and does not change during the process.
It was shown in [11] that there is a strategy for the gambler that guarantees at least 1−O( √ ln k √ k ) fraction of the payoff of the prophet, in expectation, by using a nondecreasing sequence of k stopping rules (thresholds) 8 . Next, we construct a gambler that obtains at least γ k fraction of the prophet's payoff, in expectation, by using a γ k -conservative magician as a black box. Note that γ k ≥ 1 − 1 √ k+3 . This gambler uses only a single threshold. However, he may skip some of the random variables at random. Proof: First, we compute an upper bound on the expected payoff of the prophet. Let q i be the probability that the prophet chooses V i (i.e. the probability that V i is among the k highest draws). Now let u i (q i ) denote the maximum possible contribution of the random variable V i to the expected payoff of the prophet if V i is selected with probability q i . Note that u i (q i ) is equal to the expected value of V i conditioned on being above the 1 − q i quantile. Let F i (·) and f i (·) denote the CDF and PDF of V i . u i (q i ) can be defined
By changing the integration variable and applying the chain rule we get
is a concave function. Furthermore, i q i ≤ k because the prophet cannot choose more than k random draws. So the optimal objective value of the following convex program is an upper bound on the payoff of the prophet: maximize:
be the Lagrangian. By KKT stationarity condition, at the optimal assignment, it must be that
Assuming that q i > 0, then by complementary slackness μ i = 0, which then implies
Furthermore, it is easy to show that the first constraint must be tight, which implies that i P r[V i > τ] = k. Observe that the contribution of each V i to the objective value of the convex program is exactly E[V i |V i > τ]P r[V i > τ]. Now, by using a γ k -conservative magician we can ensure that each box is opened with probability at least γ k which implies the contribution of each V i to the expected payoff of the gambler is E[V i |V i > τ]P r[V i > τ ]γ k which proves that the expected payoff of the gambler is at least γ k fraction of optimal objective value of the convex program, which was itself and upper bound on the expected payoff of the prophet.
THE TWO GENERIC MECHANISMS
In this section, we present the details of the approach that was outlined in section 2. The model and assumptions were explained in that section. We start by proving that an (approximately) optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem can always be constructed from n (approximately) optimal primary mechanisms.
Theorem 5. Suppose for each buyer i, we have an αapproximate primary mechanism M i and a matching concave primary benchmark R i , as defined in Def. 1. Consider the mechanism M which simply uses M i (q i ) independently for each buyer i, whereq i is the optimal assignment of the following convex program. Then M is a feasible mechanism for the relaxed problem and its expected object value is at least an α-fraction of the optimal objective value of the convex program, which is itself an upper bound on the expected objective value of the optimal mechanism. maximize:
Proof: Let M * be any optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem. For each buyer i, we construct a single buyer mechanism M * i as follows. M * i creates n − 1 dummy buyers whose types are randomly drawn from D −i . It then runs M * on buyers i and the n − 1 other dummy buyers. Note that buyer i cannot tell the different between M * i and the original M * because buyers types are distributed independently. Observe that the contribution of buyer i to the expected objective value of M * is the same as her contribution to the expected objective value of M * i . So the mechanism that runs M * 1 , · · · , M * n independently, has the same expected objective value and the same expected probabilities of allocation as M * . Now let q * ij = E t∼D [X M * ij (t)] be the expected probability that M * allocates a copy of item j to buyer i. Observe that q * ij is a feasible assignment for the convex program. Furthermore, the expected object value of M * is equal to the sum of the expected objective values of M * 1 , · · · , M * n which is upper bounded by i R i (q * i ). So the optimal objective value of the convex program may only be higher than the expected objective value of M * . Now observe that the expected objective value of the mechanism M is at least i α · R i (q i ) whereq i is the optimal assignment for the convex program. So the expected objective value of M is at least α-fraction of the expected objective value of M * .
Note that in Theorem 5, R i are concave functions by definition. However, we shall show that the optimal primary benchmarks are also concave. Theorem 6. The optimal primary benchmarks are always concave.
Proof: We prove this for an arbitrary buyer i. Let M i and R i denote the optimal primary mechanism and the optimal primary benchmark for buyer i. To show that R i is concave, it is enough to show that for any q, q ∈ [0, 1] m and any α ∈ [0, 1], the following inequality holds:
. Consider the single buyer mechanism M that works as follows: M uses M i (q) with probability α and uses M i (q ) with probability 1 − α. Because we assumed M i is a convex space, M ∈ M i . Observe that by linearly of expectation, the expected probabilities of allocation for M is no more than αq + (1 − α)q and the expected objective value of M is αR i (q) + (1 − α)R i (q ). So the expected objective value of the optimal primary mechanism, subject to the upper bound of αq + (1 − α)q on the expected probabilities of allocation, may only be higher. That
Next, we present a detailed description of the two generic mechanisms that were outlined in section 2. Throughout the rest of this section, we assume that for each buyer i, we have an α-approximate primary mechanism M i and a corresponding concave primary benchmark R i . First, we present the pre-rounding mechanism.
Mechanism 1 (γ-Pre-Rounding).
(I) Solve the convex program of (CP R ) and letq ij denote an optimal assignment for it. (II) For each item j ∈ 1 · · · m: create an instance of γ-conservative magician (see Alg. 1) with k j magic wands. We will use these magicians through the rest of the mechanism. Note that γ is a parameter that is given. (III) For each buyer i ∈ 1 · · · n: a) For each j ∈ 1 · · · m: writeq ij on a box and present it to the j th magician. Let Y ij denote the indicator random variable which is 1 iff the magician opens the box. Setq ij ←q ij Y ij . b) Run the mechanism M i (q i ) on buyer i and use its outcome as the final outcome for buyer i. Furthermore, let X i1 , . . . , X im denote the indicator random variables for the allocation of M i (q i ). c) For each j ∈ 1 · · · m: if X ij = 1, then break the wand of the j th magician.
In order for Mech. 1 to retain at least a γ-fraction of the the expected objective value of each M i (q i ), we have to make further technical assumptions. We show that it is enough to assume that each R i has a budgetbalanced and cross monotonic cost sharing scheme. Next we define this formally. and S, T ⊂ [m], ξ(j, S,q i ) ≥ ξ(j, S ∪ T,q i ).
The above requirement on R i can be interpreted in the following manner. Roughly it means that the contribution of each item j to the expected objective value of the primary mechanism for buyer i should not decrease when items other than j are being precluded from buyer i. The following are some examples of environments where this assumption holds. (i) When R i (q i [S]) is a submodular function of S. (ii) For welfare objective, assuming that the buyers' valuations are submodular. (iii) For revenue maximization when the buyers' valuations are submodular and M is restricted to mechanisms that can be interpreted as buyer specific item pricing.
Theorem 7 (γ-Pre-Rounding). Suppose for each buyer i we have an α-approximate primary mechanism M i and a corresponding concave primary benchmark R i that has a budget balanced cross monotonic cost sharing scheme. Then, for any γ ∈ [0, γ k ], the γ-pre-rounding mechanism (Mech. 1) is a feasible mechanism in M. Furthermore, it is a γ · α-approximation of the optimal mechanism in M. Note that the resulting mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). Remark 1. The γ-pre-rounding mechanism assumes no control and no prior information about the order in which buyers are visited. The order specified in the mechanism is arbitrary and could be replaced by any other ordering which may be unknown in advance. In particular, this mechanism can be adopted to online settings where buyers are served in an unknown order.
Next, we present the post-rounding mechanism.
Mechanism 2 (γ-Post-Rounding).
(I) Solve the convex program of (CP R ) and letq ij denote an optimal assignment for it. (II) For each buyer i ∈ 1 · · · n: run the corresponding primary mechanism M i (q i ) on buyer i and let X i1 , . . . , X im and P i denote the random variables for the allocation and the payment of M i . Furthermore, letq ij be the actual marginal probability of allocating item j to buyer i by M i (q i ). Note thatq ij ≤q ij . (III) For each item type j ∈ 1 · · · m: a) Create a new instance of the γ-conservative magician (see Alg. 1) with k j magic wands. This is the j th magician. b) For each i ∈ 1 · · · n: create a box corresponding to X ij and writeq ij on the box and present it to the j th magician. Let Y ij denote the indicator random variable which is 1 iff the magician chooses to open the box. Set X ij ← X ij Y ij . If X ij = 1 then break the magician's wand. (IV) For each buyer i ∈ 1 · · · n: charge buyer i a payment of P i ← γP i and for each j ∈ 1 · · · m, allocate a copy of item j to buyer i iff X ij = 1.
In order for Mech. 2 to be applicable, we need to make further technical assumptions. The following assumptions are sufficient to ensure that Mech. 2 is truthful and retains at least a γ-fraction of the expected objective value of each M i (q i ).
• We must be able to compute the actual expected probabilities of allocation for each M i (q i ). Note thatq i is only an upper bound on these probabilities. • The objective function W i (t i , x i , p i ), must be submodular in x i and linear in payment. • The space of mechanism M should only be restricted to Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms and may not be restricted to any stronger concept of truthfulness. • The valuations of each buyer should be in the form of a weighted rank function of some matroid.
Note that the above assumptions are not the only possible set of assumptions that are sufficient for the applicability of Mech. 2. Next we define the last assumption formally.
Definition 6 (Valuations as Matroid Weighted Rank Functions). Valuations of a buyer for bundles of items can be represented as a weighted rank function of a matroid if there is a matroid whose ground set is the set of items, such that for any bundle S of items:
• If S is an independent set of the matroid, then the valuation of the buyer for S is just the sum of her valuations for each item in S. • If S is not an independent set, then the valuation of the buyer for S is equal to her valuation of an independent subset S ⊂ S with the maximum valuation.
In particular, additive valuations with capacities, unit demand valuations, etc. can be represented as matroid weighted rank functions 10 .
Theorem 8 (γ-Post-Rounding). Suppose for each buyer i we have an α-approximate primary mechanism M i and a corresponding concave primary benchmark R i . Suppose all of the assumptions mentioned earlier hold. Then, for any γ ∈ [0, γ k ], the γ-post-rounding mechanism (Mech. 2) is a feasible mechanism in M. Furthermore, it is a γ · α-approximation of the optimal mechanism in M. Note that the resulting mechanism is only Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC). 10 note that budget constraints are not part of the valuations.
AN EXAMPLE PRIMARY MECHANISM
In this section, we present an example of a primary mechanism for the following setting. We consider a buyer with correlated and additive valuations with a capacity and a hard budget constraint. We assume that the size of the type space of the buyer is polynomially bounded. Since a primary mechanism only interacts with a single buyer, we shall drop the subscript i. For each possible type t of the buyer, let v tj denote her valuation for item j. Also let f (t) denote the probability that the buyer's type is t. Furthermore, suppose that the buyer has a total budget of B and is interested in at most C items. We assume that the only private information of the buyer is her type and everything else is publicly known. Note that this is exactly the setting considered in [3] . They present a 1 4 -approximate BIC mechanism for maximizing revenue. Next, we present a truthful optimal primary mechanism for maximizing revenue, which can be converted to a γ k -approximate BIC mechanism for multiple buyers, using the γ-post-rounding. Remember that γ k is at least 1 2 and approaches 1 as k increases. Consider the following linear program in which x tj is the variable corresponding to the probability of allocating item j when the buyer has reported type t and p t is the variable for the payment for type t. The optimal objective value of this LP is an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal primary mechanism when restricted to allocate each item j with probability at mostq j :
We construct the optimal primary mechanism as follows.
Mechanism 3.
• Define the optimal primary benchmark R(q) to be the optimal objective value of (LP rev ) as a function ofq = (q 1 , · · · ,q m ). • Givenq 1 , · · · ,q m , solve the linear program of (LP rev ) to compute x tj and p t . • If the buyer reports her type as t then charge her a payment of p t and allocate each item j with probability x tj as explained next. Use the dependent randomize rounding algorithm of [10] to round each x tj to either 0 or 1 such that if X j is the result of rounding the x tj then E[X j ] = x tj and such that j X j ≤ C. Then, for each j allocate a copy of item j to the buyer iff X j = 1.
Theorem 9. The primary mechanism Mech. 3 is a truthful optimal primary mechanism for maximizing revenue and satisfies all the requirements of γ-postrounding.
